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This paper deals with the much discussed question how to design labor market policy in a global
economy. The starting point of the paper is the fact that national unemployment rates differ
greatly, which alludes to country-specific institutional factors being the most plausible culprit for
rising and lasting unemployment. Hence, identifying institutional setups which promote
employment growth is a prerequisite for successfully fighting unemployment. To this end the
paper is divided into three main sections. The first section provides a non-technical synopsis of
the main causes of persistently high unemployment which can in particular be observed in
continental Europe. Special emphasis is put on the question how the ongoing process of
globalization of goods and factor markets relates to the rise of unemployment. The by now
standard explanation of rising unemployment is a change in the structure of labor demand
towards higher skill requirements, be they caused by growing inter-industry trade or skill-biased
technical progress, which conflicts with rigid wage structures in continental Europe. However, a
number of important shortcomings of this approach are pointed out, which show that this is
hardly an encompassing explanation.
It is therefore argued that other factors must also be important. There can be little question that
globalization opens greater exit possibilities for not-yet invested capital which is, once invested,
threatened by appropriation by strong insiders in certain countries, that it increases the potential
for specialization in production and the pressure towards switching from a Tayloristic to a holistic
organization of production structures thus exacerbating appropriability problems, that it broadens
the technological menu by facilitating international technology transfers thus allowing a greater
degree of substitution of labor by capital and finally that it exposes firms and workers to greater
volatilities, i.e. a less stable macroeconomic environment. It is shown how these factors interact
and how they conflict with important characteristics of in particular the German economy, which
however is not too dissimilar from a number of other continental European countries. These
characteristics are mainly generous and long-lasting transfer payments to the unemployed, high
firing costs and centralized wage-setting.2
The second section discusses how labor-market institutions should be reformed and how labor-
market policy should be redesigned in order to achieve better employment results. Under the
premise that the above-mentioned factors are indeed important in explaining the severe
unemployment problem, it is clear that the thrust of such reforms must be in the direction of
reducing aggregate wage pressure, of achieving greater flexibility in wage-setting and in
employment contracts, of correcting currently distorted incentive structures of the unemployed
towards accepting a greater variety of jobs, and of helping the unemployed in building the kind of
human capital that is actually demanded by firms. There can be no doubt that global competition
forces countries to put greater emphasis on the efficiency aspects of labor market institutions by
leaving less scope for achieving distributional goals via labor market institutions. The
government has got mainly three instruments of labor market policy at its disposal:
unemployment insurance, active labor market policy and firing costs. The first two are put under
particular scrutiny in the paper. It is discussed in detail how both policy instruments can be
redesigned and interwoven in order to alter the incentive structures of outsiders, insiders and
firms in favor of more employment, not only by reducing wage pressure and labor costs for firms,
but also by exposing outsiders to a mixture of pressure and financial incentives towards searching
more intensively for a new job. The paper elaborates on how an integrated system of
unemployment benefits and of active labor market policies should look like. The issue of firing
costs is also briefly addressed. Reducing state-imposed firing costs is an evident policy
conclusion arising out of the analysis. An elaborate reform of the unemployment insurance
system would make a reduction of firing costs less controversial as employers would then be
penalized by higher contributions to the unemployment insurance system for above average
turnover in their firms. This would already give workers some protection against arbitrary layoffs
reducing the necessity of further state-imposed firing costs.
The third section finally discusses the positive economics of labor market policy in a global
economy. Essentially all OECD countries are under pressure towards redesigning labor market
institutions and policy in a more efficient way. However, progress in this direction varies widely
between countries not least due to difficulties in enforcing efficiency-enhancing reforms in the
political decision making process. However, it is shown that encompassing reform packages are
more likely to be politically viable than piecemeal reforms.3
I. Introduction
This paper deals with the much discussed question how to design labor market policy in a global
economy. Mass unemployment is clearly the principal economic policy problem in most
continental European countries nowadays and rising unemployment is often associated with more
open goods and factor markets which are labeled with the catchword "globalization". Patience of
the public diminishes in expecting governments to offer and successfully execute remedies to this
grossly inefficient and unjust state of affairs on labor markets. The liberalization of trade and of
capital flows is in acute danger of being reverted if the perception becomes even more widespread
that growing unemployment is the inevitable consequence of globalization. Governments which
fail or are too slow in reducing unemployment are relentlessly voted out of office these days. The
German case is only one example in kind. However, lasting success in the fight against
unemployment can only be expected if a correct diagnosis precedes the design and
implementation of policy measures. Quixotic policies such as a move towards protectionism,
which governments are all too tempted to undertake, are in general at best successful in the very
short run while often exacerbating the unemployment problem in the longer run.
Hence, even a policy-oriented paper such as this one must in a first step outline the principal
causes of rising unemployment. Economists have by now written extensively on European
unemployment. It is generally recognized that unemployment in Europe is predominantly
structural, i. e. a quasi-equilibrium phenomenon with only a minor cyclical component.
1 Hence,
expansionary demand policies cannot be the main tool in fighting unemployment. Most of the
burden must be shouldered by supply-side policies which above all have to improve the
functioning of labor markets. However, there is much less agreement on which shocks and which
transmission mechanisms cause unemployment to grow inexorably in some countries while
returning to and apparently staying at moderate levels in other countries. Yet, a precise
understanding of these shocks and of the relevant transmission mechanisms is crucial for
selecting the most effective institutional reforms and labor-market policies. The observable great
differences in national unemployment rates point to country-specific institutional factors as being
                                             
1 See Feldstein (1997), Krugman (1994), Lindbeck (1996), van der Willigen (1995), and Viñals and Jimeno (1996).
The OECD estimates that 85% of German unemployment in 1997 were of the structural type.4
important in explaining unemployment performances. Hence, identifying institutional setups
which promote employment growth in a global economy is a prerequisite for successfully fighting
unemployment.
To this end the paper is divided into three main sections. The first section provides a non-
technical synopsis of the main causes of persistently high unemployment which can in particular
be observed in continental Europe. Special emphasis is put on the question how the ongoing
process of globalization of goods and factor markets conflicts with the institutional setup of these
economies in general, but in particular of the labor market in continental Europe thus producing
rising unemployment. The second section discusses how labor-market institutions and labor-
market policy should be reformed in order to achieve better employment results. Building on the
results of the first section, two areas are put under particular scrutiny: the system of transfer
payments to the unemployed and the design of active labor market policies. The third section
elaborates on how labor-market reforms can be made viable in the politico-economic decision-
making process.
II. A Synopsis of the Principal Causes of Unemployment in Europe
Unemployment has not always been higher in continental Europe compared to the U.S. Starting
in the early seventies and taking in particular France and Germany as the two largest continental
European countries for comparison, figure 1 shows that unemployment was at that time
considerably lower than in the U.S. So the question really is what has happened in the meantime
to reverse the picture in such a dramatic way. Of course, since the early seventies were almost
thirty years ago, a lot of things influencing the situation on labor markets have happened.
However, in order to gain a broad picture it is useful to briefly highlight two stories, which are
often presented before moving to more recent ideas in this respect: hysteresis and shifts in relative
labor demand.5


































































































Source: OECD Employment Outlook.
1. Hysteresis
The first story is based on large temporary shocks coupled with hysteresis in unemployment rates.
The two oil price shocks in the seventies along with the switch towards restrictive demand
policies in the early eighties constituted such large macroeconomic shocks.
2 Although these
                                             
2 The German economy was of course in addition hit by the reunification shock. However, to keep the perspective of
labor market policy in a global economy, special problems arising out of the transition from a socialist to a market6
shocks were only temporary they can lead to a lasting rise in unemployment if coupled with
hysteresis mechanisms on labor markets. The insider-outsider trap is the main reason why the
unemployment rate might stay at a higher level even though the original shock has subsided in the
meantime. Insider-outsider problems arise in particular if the bargaining position of insiders in
wage negotiations is strong even when confronted with a high unemployment rate and if outsiders
are generously and indefinitely supported by the welfare state. Both hysteresis mechanisms are
certainly to a much larger extent present in countries such as France and Germany compared to
the more rigorously market-oriented system of the U.S. Yet, the pure hysteresis approach for
explaining the dismal unemployment performance in continental Europe does not appear
convincing. The mentioned shocks occurred a long time ago and unemployment rates can already
by definition not exhibit strict hysteresis. Estimations of wage-setting equations suggest strong
persistence in unemployment rates, due to the lack of a wage-moderating effect of the level of
long-term unemployment, but not pure hysteresis in wage setting, because the level of
unemployment and not only its change influence wage setting.
3 Furthermore, the hysteresis
approach is too static as it delivers no explanation for the much better ability of the American
economy to create new jobs and for the fact that young workers with the right skills have in fact
often been able to enter successfully continental European labor markets. Hence, although
hysteresis mechanisms are certainly stronger in continental Europe than in the U.S., today's
unemployment cannot be based solely on this foundation. Rather, more fundamental and lasting
changes in the determinants of labor demand, labor supply and wage setting must be looked for.
2. Shifts in Relative Labor Demand
The by now standard explanation of rising unemployment is a change in the structure of labor
demand towards higher skill requirements of firms, either caused by growing inter-industry trade
or skill-biased technical progress or sector-specific technical progress, which conflicts with rigid
wage structures in continental Europe. At first sight, this approach fits nicely with the facts that
unemployment in continental Europe predominantly afflicts low-skilled workers, while this group
                                                                                                                                                  
economy are excluded from the analysis. This restriction is furthermore justified by the fact that this is a large
research area of its own.
3 See e.g. Elmeskov (1993) and Layard (1996).7
faces a growing working-poor problem in the U.S., where wage structures are more flexible due
to a less generous welfare state, weaker unions and less union coverage. Thus, in the words of
Krugman (1994), the unemployment problem in continental Europe and the working poor
problem in the U.S. could be two sides of the same coin. If based on the trade argument or on the
faster diffusion of knowledge, this approach has also got the appealing property of linking the
much discussed process of globalization to the unemployment issue.
However, a number of points have to be raised before precipitately accepting this reasoning as the
major explanation for the rise of unemployment in continental Europe. First, it has been
increasingly recognized by now that inter-industry trade, and this is the one that only counts here,
cannot have contributed much in the way of changing the structure of labor demand with respect
to skills. Second, it is by no means clear, whether the world-wide speed of skill-biased technical
progress, which is undoubtedly accelerated by growing trade, has grown sufficiently in recent
years.
4 A high but constant speed of technical progress does not suffice to explain rising
unemployment, if wage structures have not become more rigid and if the qualification spectrum
of workers has not deteriorated. Yet, there is no convincing evidence for either one of these two
possibilities. Third, unemployment among low-skilled workers is as much a problem in the U.S.
as it is in Europe (table 1). Unskilled unemployment in the U.S. has in fact risen by more than
100% since the early seventies despite of the substantial fall in unskilled wages. Yet, in contrast
to continental Europe, the more flexible wage structure allowed substantial employment growth
even among low-earning workers.
5
                                             
4 Technical progress is usually measured as a residual so that its high explanatory power could also be interpreted as
a lack of concrete knowledge.
5 See Ochel (1998).8













USA 1979-82 5,7 9,4 2,1 4,5
1983-86 7,3 12,8 2,7 4,7
1987-90 5,1 9,8 2,1 4,7
1991-93 6,0 11,0 3,0 3,7
1994 6,2 12,8 4,8 2,7
1995 5,6 10,9 4,1 2,7
Germany 1979-82 3,4 7,6 2,0 3,8
1983-86 6,3 13,9 3,3 4,2
1987-90 4,9 12,1 2,9 4,2
1991-93 4,1 10,7 2,2 4,9
1994 7,3 14,8 5,8 2,6
1995 7,2 13,5 5,4 2,5
France 1979-82 5,2 6,5 2,1 3,1
1983-86 6,7 9,0 2,5 3,6
1987-90 7,2 10,8 2,6 4,1
1991-93 8,1 12,1 4,2 2,9
1994 10,9 13,5 7,6 1,8
1995 9,8 12,8 7,1 1,8
UK 1979-82 7,7 12,2 3,9 3,1
1983-86 10,5 18,2 4,7 3,9
1987-90 7,5 13,5 4,0 3,4
1991-93 10,8 17,1 6,2 2,8
1994 11,5 18,8 7,1 2,6
1995 10,2 17,2 6,3 2,7
Sweden 1979-82 2,4 3,1 0,9 3,4
1983-86 3,1 4,1 1,1 3,7
1987-90 1,8 2,4 1,0 2,4
1991-93 5,8 6,9 2,8 2,5
1994 9,1 9,6 6,5 1,5
1995 8,5 10,6 7,4 1,4
Sources: Nickell (1996, 26 f.) und OECD Employment Outlook.
The distinguishing features between unemployment in the U.S. and Europe are nonetheless the
better performance in the overall unemployment rate and the much lower rate of long-term
unemployment (table 2). This alludes to the two probably most important caveats concerning this
approach: its validity requires that there has only been a change in the structure of labor demand
towards higher skill requirements of firms and not an overall reduction of labor demand at given
real wages. Hence, the increase in unemployment must essentially be a mismatch phenomenon
with unemployment among low-skilled workers rising and among high-skilled workers falling.
This cannot be the whole story as becomes immediately clear upon closer inspection of table 1.9
Unemployment among high-skilled workers has also risen in most OECD countries and in
particular in France, Germany and the U.S. In fact, assuming an isoelastic wage-setting curve as
in Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), the relative sizes of the increases in unemployment in the
different skill groups point more to macroeconomic shocks than to changes in the structure of
labor demand. A greater percentage point increase in unemployment among low-skilled workers
is perfectly compatible with macroeconomic shocks as real wages are more rigid at the lower end
of the wage distribution and as sorting effects induce firms to keep preferably higher skilled
persons in case of crisis, e.g. due to higher investments in their firm-specific human capital.
6
Table 2: The Share of Long-Term Unemployment
Year USA Germany France UK Sweden
1983 13,3 41,6 42,2 45,6 10,3
1989 5,7 49,0 43,9 40,8 6,3
1990 5,5 46,8 38,0 34,4 4,7
1991 6,3 31,5 37,2 28,8 4,2
1992 11,1 33,5 36,1 35,4 8,3
1993 11,5 40,0 34,2 42,5 10,9
1994 12,2 44,3 38,3 45,4 17,3
1995 9,7 48,7 42,3 43,6 15,8
1996 9,5 47,8 39,5 39,8 17,1
Source: OECD Employment Outlook.
This assessment is also confirmed by empirical analyses of the relationship between the rate of
vacancies and the rate of unemployment over time. They show, e.g. for Germany, that the
Beveridge curve has moved outwards but that the increase in unemployment is not accompanied
by an equal rise in the rate of vacancies. Persistently high unemployment in continental Europe
can therefore not be a pure mismatch phenomenon based on a changing structure of labor demand
in combination with rigid relative wages. More flexible wage structures would certainly help in
reducing unemployment, but a thorough explanation for the dismal situation on labor markets in
continental Europe must rather move on and also look for macroeconomic problems.
7
                                             
6 See Nickell and Bell (1995) and Blanchard (1995).
7 Nickell (1997) points out that the skill shift accounts for at most 20 percent of the rise in unemployment in Europe,
and that supposedly flexible Britain did not fare better in this respect than the rigid continental European countries.10
3. Appropriation, Capital Formation and Technological Sclerosis
A general and ongoing increase in the aggressiveness of wage setting in continental Europe could
of course in principle account for rising unemployment. However, while there is some evidence
in this direction based on rising labor shares and mounting wage gaps in the seventies and early
eighties, this conjecture is less convincing for the late eighties and early nineties. This should not
be surprising. The late sixties and early seventies were characterized by a strengthening of unions
and by an expansion of welfare states in continental Europe. This development of strengthening
workers’ bargaining position culminated and ended in Germany with the introduction of
extensive codetermination rights in the mid seventies. The power of unions, e.g. in terms of union
coverage and membership, has, if anything, decreased since then and it is fair to say that the
generosity of welfare states has by and large been kept unchanged, albeit at a high level. Hence,
changes in the aggressiveness of wage setting and for that matter also changes in the incentive
structure of the unemployed to stay idle are hardly promising avenues for explaining further rising
unemployment in continental Europe in the eighties and nineties. It rather appears that labor
demand has undergone additional changes beyond a move towards higher skill requirements of
firms which undoubtedly has occurred to some extent. It is noteworthy that labor shares have by
now dropped in France and Germany below the level in the U.S.
To make some leeway in analyzing in an admittedly highly stylized form the evolution of labor
demand in continental Europe, the following standard description of the labor market is useful.
Labor supply LS is for simplicity assumed to be infinitely elastic with respect to the real wage w
up to full employment and completely inelastic beyond. The wage-setting curve WS, which
reflects union wage bargaining and/or efficiency wage considerations, is as usual upward sloped
so that increasing employment L leads to higher real wage settlements. The key to understanding
the evolution of unemployment in continental Europe seems to be adjustments of labor demand
LD. The reaction of labor demand to wage-setting shocks depends very much on the time span
which is considered. Firing costs, putty-clay production technology, convex costs of changing
factor proportions, delivery contracts etc. make labor demand highly inelastic in the short run as
depicted by the vertical instantaneous labor demand curve  LD
SR . Hence, capital is exposed to
appropriation by myopic insiders. If a wage shock occurs, e.g. due to higher firing costs, the11
wage-setting curve moves from WS to WS'. Employment does in this extreme case not change at
all in the short run and the economy is simply moved from point A to point B.
8 However, there is
of course some substitutability between labor and capital over time as is reflected by medium-run
labor demand curve  LD
K
MR, so that employment will decrease to a point like C where the size of
the capital stock is still unchanged. This is by no means the end of the story, though. The return to
capital in point C is still lower than in the initial point A. Assuming that capital received in A just
the internationally required rate of return and furthermore assuming that this world-wide interest
rate has not changed in the meantime, capital clearly has an incentive to move out of the country
concerned until the rate of return on capital rises back to its original level. Hence, a further
reduction in employment is effectuated until point D is realized. Point D lies on the long-run
labor demand curve  LDET
LR  with a perfectly variable size of the capital stock and an efficient
choice of technology.
9
Fig. 2: The Long-Run Effects of Appropriation Problems
                                             
8 It is noteworthy that the speed in the reaction of labor demand to wage-push shocks is about four times higher in the
U.S. than in Europe (Siebert 1997), so that capital is more exposed to appropriation in Europe.
9 See Blanchard (1997) and (1998).12
The analysis has hitherto abstracted from repercussions of the original wage-setting shock on the
efficiency properties of the process of creative destruction. This is of course not innocuous once
the analysis is extended to the long-run. A wage-push shock due to higher firing costs derails the
process of creative destruction and moves the economy on a sclerotic time path. It artificially
induces firms to invest less and when investing new vintages of capital to select production
technologies which rely more on the use of capital in the production process. In other words, such
an economy embarks on a different time path concerning the evolution of the production
technology: firms will switch to more capital intensive production technologies in order to
become less open to appropriation by insiders. The appropriability problem arises due to the
existence of specific quasi-rents in the production process which cannot be contracted away. Such
specific quasi-rents can be due to technological reasons such as firm-specific knowledge of
workers and firm-financed training of workers or they can also be due to political reasons such as
high firing costs possibly reinforced by generous unemployment benefits and a high level of
unionization. Strong legal protection of management in publicly traded firms against close control
by firm-owners is another politically induced and possibly important appropriation problem
causing technological sclerosis.
10
The late sixties and early seventies clearly witnessed politically induced appropriation shocks.
Firing costs were raised, unions gained in power and the welfare state in general expanded. Such
an appropriation shock has negative long-run effects on the process of creative destruction and
thus on employment. Not only was job creation unequivocally reduced, but rising unemployment
depressed in addition shadow wages, i.e. earning opportunities of workers when they are laid off,
thus reducing their appropriation potential and pressure to scrap old vintages of capital. The
resulting increase in the average scrapping age of the existing capital stock causes a slowdown in
the rate of technological progress thus diminishing productivity growth and equilibrium wages.
These negative effects on the process of creative destruction can be taken into account in our
simple diagram by an additional horizontal long-run labor demand curve  LDTS
LR. It must lie
beneath LDET
LR  as it incorporates the long-run technological sclerosis effects of an attempt by
insiders to appropriate capital. Hence, unemployment increases even further to a point like E as
long as WS' remains the relevant wage-setting curve. The problem of microeconomic
                                             
10 See Caballero and Hammour (1997) and (1998a).13
specificities, which is aggravated by political institutions in particular in continental Europe,
experiences a highly inefficient macroeconomic solution.
Hence, there are long-run consequences on unemployment of the appropriation shocks which
occurred in continental Europe in the late sixties and early seventies which are usually neglected.
Three interesting implications emerge. First, similar to the Krugman (1994) approach,
appropriation problems also lead to a substitution of labor in the production process, albeit not
only by human capital but rather also by real capital. Second, the resulting long-run increase in
unemployment is related to insider power and wage setting, but the trade-off between real wage
and employment growth not only disappears, but there is actually a positive long-run relationship
because the average worker is at any given rate of unemployment eventually paid more money in
real terms in high-employment countries where the appropriation threat to capital by insiders is
less of a problem and where the process of creative destruction therefore works more smoothly
thus inducing a better allocation of resources. Third, the labor share must by implication also be
greater in the long run in such countries, so that demands to increase the labor share via an
aggressive wage policy are from a long-run perspective completely mistaken.
The ongoing process of globalization is closely linked to this appropriation issue. The greater
mobility of capital causes faster downward adjustments of the capital stock in response to an
appropriation shock. Furthermore, factor-substitution possibilities have been enhanced by
globalization, as not only the speed of technological progress but also the potential for
specialization has been increased. The broadened technological menu which firms have nowadays
at their disposal promotes investment and growth, but workers may not share in the benefits if
labor markets are heavily regulated and therefore malfunctioning. Finally, globalization
accelerates the ongoing fundamental transformation of production structures from Fordism to
holistic organizations. The implied changes in the organization of production, which essentially
take place in all highly developed countries, magnify appropriation problems as the importance of
microeconomic specificities, e.g. in terms of firm-specific knowledge is increased. Yet, this
development has a particularly severe effect on employment in countries where politically
induced appropriation problems are already large, i.e. political and technological appropriation
problems are not substitutes but they rather reinforce each other.14
4. Rising Volatilities
However, there is another important macroeconomic channel via which globalization raises
quasi-equilibrium unemployment specifically in continental Europe. The level of volatilities, i.e.
the size and frequency of shocks which firms have to cope with, has increased significantly in
recent years. This is above all the result of more globalized goods and capital markets, which give
rise to the observable rapid restructuring from manufacturing to the service industry, the already
mentioned fundamental reorganization of production and firms, "footloose" industries,
"caleidoscopic" compararative advantages, shorter product life cycles, unstable portfolio choices
of foreign investors, and more pronounced fluctuations of stock market prices.
11 The ability of
economies to absorb such greater volatilities without rising unemployment depends decisively on
their institutional characteristics. Continental Europe is in a number of ways not well prepared for
this task. First, the above-mentioned appropriability problem, which is particularly severe in
continental Europe exacerbates in an asymmetric way the susceptability of economies to shocks.
The employment effects of adverse shocks are greater than those of positive shocks in economies
which exhibit appropriability problems. Hence, recessions become deeper and booms more
shallow so that an overall increase in volatility causes average unemployment to rise.
12
Second, greater volatilities entail the need for larger fluctuations on labor markets as firms have
to adjust more often to changing economic circumstances. Yet, each layoff is coupled with an
immediate loss of firm- or sector specific human capital which, through the existence of rent
sharing, is part of the remuneration package of workers. If unemployment benefits are tied as in
continental Europe to last earnings and long-lasting, it is clear that a larger percentage of workers
will stay (voluntarily) unemployed compared to a very harsh unemployment benefit system like in
the U.S. where receipt of unemployment benefits is strictly limited to up to six months. Job offers
                                             
11 See Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994), Bertola and Ichino (1995a), Lindbeck and Snower (1996), Ljungqvist and
Sargent (1998), Rodrik (1997), and Calvo and Mendoza (1997). The latter authors show in particular that more
globalized capital markets make herd behavior of investors more likely because of fixed information costs concerning
the fundamentals of countries and firms, and because they widen the band of multiple equilibria due to reputational
effects. Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994) provide empirical evidence for the U.S. that not only the dispersion of earnings
between individuals but also the volatility of an individual's earnings has increased since the early 1980s.
12 See Caballero and Hammour (1998b).15
in new firms or sectors will usually carry lower wages as they do not include the previously
earned rent-sharing component, making them rather unattractive compared to remaining
unemployed and still benefiting at least partially from the already depreciated specific human
capital.
13
Third, high firing costs aggravate the negative effects of greater volatilities on employment.
Rising volatilities in combination with high firing costs increase total expected labor costs as the
probability rises that any particular worker becomes redundant at a given point in time so that
firms have to bear large firing costs. Hence, firms turn more reluctant to use the quasi-specific
production factor labor in the production process leading to an overall reduction in labor demand.
Rising volatilities therefore unambiguously have a greater negative effect on labor demand in a
rigid economy with high firing costs than in a flexible economy with low firing costs.
14
Fourth, a more volatile economic environment reduces in particular labor demand in countries
where firms have weak balance-sheet positions and are mainly financed by credits. A greater
volatility of shocks causes the risky rate of interest which firms are charged by banks to rise as
banks must counterbalance a higher default risk. This reduces investments so that labor demand
of firms shrinks in turn in the long run.
15 The ensuing larger marginal productivity of employed
labor is needed to compensate firms for their greater obligations concerning interest payments and
for the larger expected value of bankruptcy costs. The last two problems, high firing costs and
reliance on credit finance, in relation with greater volatilities, could in principle be offset by more
moderate wage agreements. However, high firing costs by themselves reduce the willingness of
workers to react to greater volatilities with wage moderation. Furthermore, if such shocks are
largely firm-specific, strong and central unions are unlikely to cut wage demands in reaction.
16
In sum, the ongoing process of globalization entails significant changes concerning labor demand
which conflict with important institutional characteristics of the continental European economies.
                                             
13 See Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).
14 See Bertola and Ichino (1995a) and Fehn (1997). This result stays in contrast to the findings of Bentilola and
Bertola (1990), where the effects of an increase in firing costs on labor demand at a constant level of volatilities were
found to be ambiguous.
15 Empirical evidence for the negative effect of weak balance sheet positions on labor demand is provided inter alia
by Funke et al. (1998), Nickell and Nicolitsas (1997) and Winker (1998).
16 See Aizenman and Powell (1997) and Fehn (1998).16
In particular, the following institutions appear to be highly detrimental to employment growth in
the era of globalization: generous and indefinite transfer payments to the unemployed, large firing
costs, strong and relatively centralized unions, a predominance of credit financing of firms and a
strong position of management vis-à-vis firm owners. The last two points make clear that insider-
oriented systems, be they on labor or on capital markets, always diminish employment. However,
reflecting the title of the paper the following sections only deal with labor-market policy. It
should nonetheless be kept in mind that reforms in other areas such as capital markets are highly
complementary to labor-market reforms, in the sense that they raise the achievable positive
employment effects.
17
III. Designing an Efficient Labor-Market Policy
Efforts to mitigate the negative employment effects of globalization in continental Europe should
concentrate on redesigning labor-market policy in order to help workers to cope with the
consequences of globalization rather than on the futile attempt of restricting the process of
globalization itself. The latter would in fact also reduce the opportunities to reap the benefits of
globalization. Policies to increase employment must aim at raising the capacity of labor markets
to adjust to negative shocks and at avoiding policy-induced shocks rather than on shielding labor
markets from non policy-induced shocks. Although a multitude of shocks have led to rising
unemployment in continental Europe, the number of institutional variables which act as negative
transmission mechanisms is far more limited. The task of an efficiency-oriented labor-market
policy can be boiled down even further: it must concentrate on breaking the dichotomy between
insiders and outsiders on labor markets by promoting the reintegration of outsiders into the
regular labor market. This can inter alia be achieved by an appropriate design of passive and
active labor-market policies, which will be the topic of the following sections. However, rising
and persistent unemployment is largely due to rigid, undifferentiated and overly aggressive wage
setting. Hence, a key target in reforming passive and active labor-market policies must be
exerting greater restraint on wage-setting behavior of insiders. These tasks are in principle not
different compared to the era before globalization, but fulfilling them has become far more urgent
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because the welfare losses associated with inefficient institutional settings have increased
dramatically.
The principal question is how outsiders, in particular the long-term unemployed, can be
reintegrated into the regular labor market. It is important to recognize in this context that the
ultimate goal must always be reemployment in the regular labor market as second or third labor
markets tend to become a drag on the regular economy eventually, thus further reducing regular
employment and entering into a vicious circle of rising taxes and government employment.
18
Policies will only be successful in enfranchising outsiders if they either alter their incentive
structure towards actively seeking jobs or enhance the incentives of firms to hire outsiders. The
unemployment benefit system and the design of active labor-market policy are of particular
importance in this respect. They therefore deserve to be discussed in some detail.
1. Reforming Unemployment-Benefit Systems
There can be no doubt that high levels of unemployment and especially of long-term
unemployment are related to the generosity of the unemployment benefit system. Even without
invoking Say's Law, it is immediately clear that if people are offered high and long-lasting pay for
staying idle with little pressure to accept available jobs, a lot of them will of course stay idle.
High benefits create high overall unemployment and long-term benefits generate lots of long-term
unemployment. The detrimental effects of lavish unemployment benefit systems are among the
best-documented and least controversial facts in labor economics. The negative employment
effects arise not only due to a lower search intensity of the unemployed but also because the
fallback position of insiders is improved thus making wage setting more aggressive. Empirical
studies are almost unanimous in confirming this conjecture. Hence, reforming unemployment
insurance must aim at reversing these effects, which is intricate as it involves difficult political
choices.
19
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a) Privatizing Unemployment Insurance?
A radical market-oriented reformer might suggest that government-run unemployment benefit
systems should be completely abolished, thus letting private insurances take care of the different
moral hazard effects concerning job search, wage setting and layoff patterns of firms, which are
caused by unemployment benefits. Private insurances are able to cope with moral hazard
problems on other markets, like e.g. car insurance, so that they should in principle also be able to
do so on the labor market. However, the analogy is not quite that simple. As long as the
government guarantees a minimum level of income to those citizens who cannot support
themselves, as is the case in continental Europe, people clearly lack incentive to sufficiently
insure themselves. They can always count on the government to step in if they are in need. Hence,
to avoid free-rider behavior of its citizens, the government must at least force those who have a
job to underwrite unemployment insurance contracts covering this guaranteed minimum standard
of living for a certain time period.
Yet, there are furthermore doubts as to the viability of such a private unemployment insurance
system. Not only is the probability distribution of becoming unemployed largely unknown, but
this risk also is highly correlated in the case of macroeconomic shocks, so that private insurances
might quickly go bankrupt if large macroeconomic shocks occur. Both factors make
unemployment a risk that is difficult to insure on private markets. Considering that
macroeconomic shocks, such as a large and sudden fall in stock prices, often hit several countries
simultaneously, it would not even help much if private unemployment insurances tried to
diversify internationally their portfolio of insured risks. A completely privatized system of
unemployment insurance is therefore problematic as long as efficient diversification is
impossible. It is from this perspective no coincidence that unemployment insurance is in all
highly developed countries run by the government.
20
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b) Reforms within the Current Unemployment-Benefit System
However, there is considerable scope for efficiency-enhancing reforms concerning unemployment
insurance which fall short of completely privatizing the system. Taking Germany as the
institutional benchmark, the following characteristics of the current unemployment benefit system
are noteworthy: registered unemployed persons receive benefits for an extremely long time by
international comparison (table 3). Unemployment benefits last up to 32 months depending on
age and on the time contributions were previously made. Furthermore, unemployment benefits are
followed by unemployment assistance, which is granted without time limit. Though
unemployment assistance is means-tested, the amount paid in both types of benefits depends on
previous net income as well as on family status. In each case this amount remains in principle
unchanged until payments are terminated. Pressure exerted on registered unemployed persons to
accept offered jobs has been increased in recent years but must still be considered to be low. In
particular, nobody is forced to move to another region if jobs are available there but not in her
hometown and not within a 180 minutes per day commuting distance. Unemployment insurance
is organized on the national level and is mainly financed by a flat rate social security tax on gross
wages which is levied in equal parts on workers and firms. There is no differentiation according
to risk class of workers or firms or according to region. Unemployment assistance is exclusively
financed by federal tax money.
Table 3: An International Comparison of Unemployment Insurance
U.S. Germany France UK Sweden
Benefit Replace-
ment Rate (%)










Source: Nickell (1997, 61).
Considering the well-established negative effects of the German unemployment insurance system
on the functioning of the labor market, a number of reforms need to be undertaken. The time span
for which unemployment benefits can be received is empirically the most significant factor in20
explaining country-specific differences in unemployment and especially in long-term
unemployment. Hence, cutting this maximum time span should get first priority. The
unemployment benefit system must furthermore entice people to actively seek jobs even if
available jobs differ concerning pay, qualification, region etc. from the previous one. This is the
only way of avoiding persistent unemployment in times of high volatilities and rapid structural
change. The longer an individual is unemployed, the greater must be the pressure on her in this
respect. Having held a well-paid job in a certain region for some time cannot constitute a reason
that the rest of society guarantees a related income position in this region for the rest of one's life.
These considerations first and foremost suggest that the design of unemployment assistance is
fundamentally flawed. Unemployment assistance is not part of the insurance system but benefits
are nonetheless linked to previous net income and they are granted without time limit. However,
if somebody has not been successful in finding a job until unemployment benefits have expired,
she should in case of need receive welfare benefits which have nothing to do with previous net
income. Hence, unemployment assistance should simply be abolished. Recipients should be made
aware of the fact that they are no longer part of the insurance system. The maximum time span for
receiving unemployment benefits should in addition be reduced to say something like one year
from where on the person concerned is usually considered to be long-term unemployed. Countries
with flexible labor markets and a far better unemployment performance such as the U.S. even
limit the receipt of unemployment benefits to six months.
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It must furthermore be remembered that unemployment insurance involves severe principal-agent
problems as it is impossible to even come close to identifying the causes why a worker was laid
off and to perfectly monitoring the search efforts of the unemployed. Yet, workers and firms have
plenty of room for discretionary maneuver concerning whether and why a work contract is
actually terminated. The reemployment probability depends in addition in large part on search
effort. Experiments in the U.S. have demonstrated that economic incentives greatly affect the
speed with which people leave the unemployment insurance rolls. Hence, unemployment
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insurance is not a benign transfer, it rather has repercussions on claimants' behavior. Moral-
hazard and free-rider problems can be contained by introducing the right incentives. Models
based on intertemporal utility maximization and on these moral hazard considerations suggest
that there should be a punishment for terminating work contracts and a reward for finding regular
employment again. Concerning the size of benefits this translates into a large drop in income in
the first period of unemployment, with benefits then increasing up to a peak from where they
decrease again all the way down to the level of welfare benefits. Finding a job again should in
contrast be rewarded in the early periods of reemployment possibly by only slowly phasing in
social security contributions. The total reward for reemployment must be the greater, the longer
was the previous unemployment spell in order to contain the risk of fraud. This approach to
installing a reemployment bonus is preferable to a cash handout. A cash handout would rather
raise the incentive to file for unemployment insurance even though a job might be available
immediately and even though the laid-off person would currently not believe that filing for
unemployment insurance is worth the trouble. Benefits should finally be terminated after a certain
spell of unemployment, e.g. six months, if the unemployed person received suitable job offers,
but at locations which are further away than 180 minutes per day commuting distance.
22
However, it minght also be useful to introduce a strictly rule-bound system of automatically
punishing firms for terminating work contracts. This alludes to the issue of experience rating
firms' contributions to unemployment insurance. Making the size of firms' contributions to
unemployment insurance depend on their layoff behavior would help to internalize the social
costs of layoffs. The U.S. is the only OECD country with experience rating. Based on its
beneficial effects there, U.S. researchers mostly suggest to expand the present system of
experience rating in unemployment insurance rather than to abolish it. Hence, it should be
considered to include elements of experience rating in a comprehensive reform of unemployment
insurance in Germany. Unemployment would then be taxed thus providing an incentive for firms
to engage in stable activities and to smooth production over seasons and cycles. Experience rating
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would furthermore reduce cross subsidies from stable sectors, such as the service sector, to
unstable sectors, such as construction. Hence, the overall stability of the economy would be
promoted. Such a system of experience rating would have an additional advantage. It would
protect workers against arbitrary layoffs thus reducing the case for government-imposed firing
costs.
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However, experience rating would further strengthen the position of insiders in wage
negotiations. Hence, introducing a comprehensive system of experience rating would only make
sense if government-imposed firing costs are simultaneously reduced. Firing costs e.g. in the form
of severance payments are not only large in the German case, but they are also hard to calculate
ex ante as their actual size mostly depends on rather discretionary decisions of labor courts.
German labor courts usually give priority to the interests of the worker concerned with little
consideration of the macroeconomic consequences. This has very negative repercussions on the
hiring decisions of firms and thus on long-run employment growth. The detrimental effects not
only rise with the volatility of the economic environment, but they also increase the potential of
insiders to appropriate firms by improving the fallback position of insiders.
Firing costs are only justified as they force firms to carry part of the mobility costs which are
otherwise exclusively borne by workers in case of layoff and by protecting workers against short-
term and maybe arbitrary dismissals. However, both goals would already be achieved by
experience rating in combination with sufficiently long notification periods so that severance
payments become in fact superfluous. Labor law should furthermore state very clearly under
which circumstances it is legal to fire a worker in order to reduce insecurity in this field. The rule-
bound element in labor relations would be promoted by substituting experience rating in
unemployment insurance for the current system of large and hard-to-calculate goverment-
imposed firing costs. The tendency that labor is becoming more and more a quasi-fixed factor
would be reversed. Firms could react more quickly to greater volatilities so that employment
growth would be promoted. However, unemployment insurance must be reformed in tandem with
abolishing government-imposed firing costs. The increase in volatilities would otherwise induce a
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much greater rate of lay-offs, and this would cause an even further rise in long-term
unemployment as long as unemployment insurance is not reformed in the outlined direction.
Returning to the issue of transfer payments to the unemployed, unemployment insurance should
rely as much as possible on insurance principles. It is therefore not justified to differentiate
payments according to family status. Income redistribution in favor of families should be
completely detached from unemployment insurance.
24 Unemployed parents who receive
unemployment benefits which are below their claims to welfare benefits are entitled anyway to
receive the difference in the form of supplementary welfare benefits. If a needy person has not
found a job after one year of unemployment, she has access to welfare benefits. However, to
again contain moral hazard problems, the full amount of welfare benefits should only be granted
if at least one of the two following conditions is satisfied. First, the unemployed person is not able
to work, e.g. due to having small dependent children or due to being severely handicapped.
Second, she does not refuse training or jobs offered by the local authorities even though these
might be of menial character and involve no or only very little additional pay. Her level of
welfare benefits should be reduced and in severe cases completely terminated if a long-term
unemployed person who is able to work rejects such job offers or training. Confronting the
unemployed with such a choice is the only effective way of dismantling their advantage
concerning leisure time. The opportunities of the unemployed to work on the black market would
be curtailed and envy effects of people holding a job would be kept in check. Such envy effects
arise especially in case of families because a working spouse with children often earns a net wage
which is only marginally above the level of welfare benefits. The fairness and reciprocity
principles of the welfare state would be strengthened by strictly enforcing these conditions.
c) Opening Unemployment Insurance for Institutional Competition
However, society as a whole might not yet be willing to go down this road of reforming transfer
payments to the unemployed. Confidence in market mechanisms is scarce and many people will
therefore doubt whether positive employment effects will materialize. Yet, the support for such
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reforms hinges on the size of the perceived positive employment effects because the unemployed
are obviously treated more harshly. Considering the widespread but completely misguided
thinking in given amounts of labor demand as the limiting factor for employment suggests that
this support will be rather limited. The unemployment benefit system should therefore simply be
openend for the concept of institutional competition between regions. The above proposals can
then be taken as an institutional benchmark for an efficiency-oriented system but each region
would be free in deciding the precise design of its unemployment benefit system. Each region
should be allowed to give individuals considerable choice concerning their unemployment
insurance package such as the level and contour of benefits and the eligibility criteria. The
contributions of the insured would then depend on how encompassing the chosen package is.
Reductions of firms' contributions due to a worker choosing a package which is less generous
than a predefined standard package would have to be paid out to the worker to set her incentives
right.
25
Some regions are likely to choose stricter and more elaborate systems than the inefficient current
system. The positive employment effects of more efficient setups in these regions will over time
become evident to other regions as well. Pressure will therefore increase to undertake reforms in
the same direction. Such an institutional competition approach requires of course that the
financing of unemployment benefits must then also be organized on the regional level so that
regions along with their firms and workers benefit more directly from efficient solutions. Yet,
insurance principles demand that the organization and financing of unemployment benefits only
be delegated to the level of large states such as Bavaria or North-Rhine-Westfalia. Smaller states
with few dominant sectors such as Saarlouis would have to join with others such as Hesse and
Palatine. Looking again across the Atlantic shows that unemployment insurance in the U.S. is
organized at the state level, and that the experience of the U.S. with institutional competition in
this field is encouraging.
Opening unemployment insurance for institutional competition would also allow even bolder
reforms in certain front-runner regions. Individuals could be allowed to leave unemployment
insurance altogether if they do not depend on welfare benefits for the standard duration of
                                             
25 See Snower (1995).25
unemployment insurance, e.g. one year, in case they become unemployed. Free rider behavior
could be excluded very simply by forcing individuals to keep savings amounting to at least their
claim to welfare benefits for one year in a separate Individual Unemployment Account (IUA).
26
This IUA would have to be inaccessible for its owner while holding a job and before retirement,
but it could substitute completely for contributions to unemployment insurance. Individuals
would in case of unemployment simply draw on this IUA. If the person concerned found a job
again, her choice of opting out of unemployment insurance would only be available again once
the IUA is refilled up to her specific minimum amount. Positive balances on the IUA would have
to earn interest payments approximately equal to those on government bonds. Any positive
balance that would still remain at retirement age would be paid out to the individual. Such an
IUA-system would have great advantages: individuals would draw on their own wealth to finance
limited periods of unemployment rather than immediately collecting checks from the state.
Consequently, they would tend to be more diligent in searching for work and they would also
have a stronger incentive to explore alternatives to layoffs with employers. Furthermore, it would
no longer matter why an individual had become unemployed so that there would be savings in
terms of costs for bureaucracy. In sum, there is plenty of room for efficiency-enhancing reforms
of unemployment insurance and it is time something is done about it.
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2. Redesigning Active Labor-Market Policy
Active labor market policy (ALMP) is often celebrated as a panacea for fighting unemployment.
Politicians and international organizations alike are almost unanimous in their confidence in the
efficacy of ALMP. This broad consensus is reflected in the fact that the massive use of ALMP in
the eastern part of Germany is largely uncontroversial. ALMP are essentially measures which do
not passively finance unemployment but which are rather expected to pave the way for the
unemployed back into the regular labor market. There are three avenues via which ALMP can in
principle increase employment. ALMP can reduce asymmetries of information between labor
demand and labor supply. This is a rather uncontroversial task, which can be fulfilled both by a
government agency and by private organizations. ALMP can furthermore contribute to qualifying
the unemployed so that their qualification profile fits better with labor demand. These two
strategies are essentially aimed at reducing mismatch unemployment. The government can finally
attempt to increase aggregate employment directly via work creation schemes or via wage
subsidies.
27
Expenditures for ALMP in Germany increased massively in the late 1980s and the early 1990s,
i.e. from 0.8% of GDP in 1985 to about 1.6% of GDP in 1993. This development is obviously
related to reunification. Outlays for ALMP have been slightly reduced since then amounting to
1.3% of GDP in 1995. These numbers put Germany in a little bit above average position
concerning expenditure for ALMP in OECD countries. Especially the Scandinavian countries
spend far more on ALMP. Sweden for example used a whopping 3.0% of GDP for this purpose in
1995. These non-negligible sums reflect the widespread trust of policymakers in the efficacy of
current ALMP in fighting unemployment. However, the efficiency of ALMP in raising
employment cannot be taken for granted and rather depends upon its institutional design.
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a) Can ALMP Raise Regular Employment?
ALMP is a useful instrument for fighting unemployment if it addresses the causes of rising
unemployment and if possible negative side effects are not too large. It must in particular
contribute to increasing the adjustment capacity to shocks and to raising regular employment. If
successful, ALMP acts as a trampoline for laid-off workers, helping them to return into the
regular labor market. This is in sharp contrast to simply handing out transfer payments to the
unemployed, where the welfare state degenerates into a hammock for the unemployed, in which
they can rest without time limit and be a burden for the rest of society. It should be noted that the
impact of ALMP on regular employment must be the criterion of judgment and not official
unemployment. The government could otherwise simply declare all the unemployed to be state
employees or students, who are entitled to receiving tax money, and claim the unemployment
problem to be solved.
The idea of financing work instead of unemployment and thereby upgrading workers' skills is
appealing but in its very simple form misleading. Unemployment is of course a waste of
resources but the unemployed nonetheless fulfill an important macroeconomic function. They
dampen wage demands of insiders thus producing macroeconomic stability in terms of constant
inflation and in terms of guaranteeing capital its internationally required return. The stronger the
position of insiders is, e.g. due to high union density, large firing costs and generous
unemployment insurance, the more unemployment is needed to produce macroeconomic stability.
Simply transferring the unemployed into state-organized ALMP schemes and paying them wages
which are closely related to insider wages does therefore undermine macroeconomic stability. In
terms of figure 2, such a measure would reduce effective labor supply thus moving the LS curve
to the left and simultaneously pushing the WS curve upwards. The long-run consequences on
employment would be even worse as such an inefficient ALMP would amount to another
appropriation shock by improving the fall-back position of insiders. Hence, the economy would
become even more sclerotic and long-run labor demand is further pushed downwards. Such an
approach would end up in a government-guaranteed right to work, which is not compatible with a
market economy. The failure of the Swedish model as well as the disastrous experience of the28
centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe should have completely discredited such an
overambitious government employment policy.
28
Repercussions on wage setting are therefore important and the total employment effects of any
particular instrument of ALMP cannot be analyzed in isolation. A high reemployment quota of
participants in an ALMP scheme is on the one hand not an unequivocal indicator that this scheme
promotes employment at the macrolevel as reemployment might be at the expense of other
workers and as the fallback position of insiders might be improved. The latter effect would lead
to increased wage pressure and eventually to employment losses. On the other hand, ALMP
schemes which appear useless on first sight might reduce the welfare level of participants. If
insiders reckon that they would have to enroll into such a program in case of dismissal and bear
the extra utility loss, this would reduce wage pressure thus raising total regular employment.
Hence, a macroeconomic approach is called for evaluating ALMP.
In order to be successful, ALMP must therefore be organized in a more subtle way and especially
avoid the fallacy of increasing appropriation problems and aggregate wage pressure. ALMP must
improve the chances of the unemployed to return into the regular labor market and not simply
hide unemployment. As wage pressure is mainly contained by the short-term unemployed, ALMP
should concentrate on helping the long-term unemployed thus preventing a shrinkage of effective
labor supply. The long-term unemployed suffer from a number of disadvantages concerning their
prospects for reemployment. They not only lose work discipline and are stigmatized, but their
skills are also often inappropriate for entering into expanding sectors such as the service sector.
An efficient ALMP should counteract these effects thus increasing competitive pressure for
insiders by raising effective labor supply. ALMP can also serve as a work-test device if those
unemployed who refuse to participate in such schemes lose their claims to transfer payments.
Hence, ALMP can in principle reduce mismatch unemployment as well as unemployment due to
insider-outsider problems.
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However, badly designed ALMP can also give rise to negative employment effects.
29 First,
ALMP may raise wage pressure if the government is perceived to become employer of last resort
via this channel. This would further blur responsibility for persistently high unemployment. The
public already tends to hold the government and not wage setters responsible for the dismal labor-
market situation. However, wage setters and not the government should mainly be held
accountable in a market economy where wages should be the result of negotiations between
workers and firms unfettered by government interference. Expanding ALMP supports this
widespread misconception and thus even further reduces pressure on wage-bargaining parties to
consider the employment effects of their wage settlements. Moral-hazard behavior of insiders is
promoted, so that they will push for higher real wages and more rigid wage structures.
Second, ALMP can also lead to more wage pressure by increasing the utility level of outsiders,
e.g. by raising their disposable income, by improving their chances to become employed again or
by renewing their claims to receive unemployment insurance once participation in the particular
program ends (revolving door effect). This is in particular a problem if the short-term
unemployed, which is the reference group for insiders, are not excluded from participation in
ALMP schemes. An increase in their utility level improves the fallback position of insiders and
reduces pressure on insiders to display wage restraint.
Third, ALMP needs to be financed and it is usually more expensive to run ALMP schemes for the
unemployed than to simply pay them benefits. Not only are wages in ALMP schemes often
considerably above unemployment benefits but the organization of such programs is also costly.
High capital mobility in a globalized economy largely protects mobile capital from having to
finance ALMP. Hence, taxes on less mobile labor, i.e. on insiders, have to do the job. Yet, as this
reduces the net income of insiders relative to their income when unemployed, the utility loss of
being laid off is lower. This gives rise to increasing wage pressure. These three caveats show that
one must be circumspect in designing ALMP in such a way that a vicious circle consisting of
rising taxes and social security contributions, greater wage costs and shrinking regular
employment is avoided.
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Fourth, the positive effects on regular employment of ALMP must also be questioned as it is
unavoidable that some participants gain employment at the expense of other unemployed or of
insiders or that they would have been hired anyway. Such substitution, displacement and
deadweight effects reduce potential positive employment effects of ALMP. However, it can be
shown that there remains in any such case a positive net employment effect if ALMP programs
are exclusively targeted at the long-term unemployed.
30
Fifth, it must in a similar vein be questioned whether programs run by the government can qualify
the unemployed according to market needs. General skills, which become more important due to
the described changes in the organization of production, should be acquired at school age. As
ALMP schemes are almost by definition targeted at adults, they should primarily convey firm- or
sector-specific skills. Yet, firms have an inherent advantage over the government in teaching
these types of skills, so that ALMP should as a rule be organized on the job and not off the job.
31
Assessing the overall employment effect of current ALMPs is by no means an easy task since
intricate empirical questions are involved. However, it should be clear by now that the
widespread enthusiasm about ALMP being a highly effective instrument for fighting
unemployment is hardly justified. Whether ALMP in its present form really helps to raise regular
employment is not clear at all, the results are rather ambiguous. Some studies show that countries
with a higher degree of activity concerning ALMP tend to have lower unemployment rates,
though this is as mentioned above a dubious criterion for judging ALMP. Others end up with a
negligible or even negative effect on regular employment which is the criterion that should be
applied. There exists in particular the problem that the wage-raising effects of expanding ALMP
sometimes turn out to be greater than if regular employment grows by the same amount. This
underlines the importance of the argument that governments which expand ALMP exonerate
wage setters from their responsibility for the employment situation. There is very little evidence
that ALMP helps substantially in reintegrating the long-term unemployed into the regular labor
market. It rather seems that ALMP mainly serves to transform open into hidden unemployment
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thus putting a lid on the boiling pot of unemployment.
32 Although ALMP is a favorite solution of
all political camps to labor market problems, it has at best modest positive overall effects on
regular employment. In particular, government training tends to have lower returns than private
training. The case in point are Sweden's ALMPs which were for quite some time heralded as a
razor-blade sharp weapon against unemployment, but put to the test in the 1990s they were found
wanting.
33
b) What Should an Efficient ALMP Look Like?
ALMP is therefore only able to raise regular employment if it is targeted at the long-term
unemployed, if it contributes in particular to providing the long-term unemployed with
marketable skills on the job and if support for any specific individual has a strict upper time
limit.
34 Such design features not only help to keep wage-raising effects and the financial burden
to the government in check but they are also important in the sense that only well-qualified
workers will in the longer run be employed on the regular labor market without falling into the
working-poor category. The Benefit Transfer Program, which has been proposed in recent years
by Dennis Snower incorporates by and large these criteria for an employment-oriented reform of
ALMP.
35 It suggests that the unemployed should receive after a certain time spent in
unemployment a hiring voucher which is worth a specific amount of money in addition to their
regular unemployment benefits. The unemployed are entitled to hand these vouchers over to firms
which are willing to hire them. The hiring firms can tranform these vouchers into cash by handing
them over to the government agency which is in charge, e.g. the labor office. Hence, these
vouchers are essentially a wage subsidy which is directly linked to the claims of the unemployed
to government benefits. There is no extra financial burden to the government as long as
deadweight, substitution and displacement effects are not too large, because unemployment
benefits are of course terminated once such a person finds a job.
36 The vouchers raise the critical
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wage level at which firms are willing to hire the respective unemployed. Thus, the number of
mutually beneficial work contracts rises. To promote especially human capital formation, the cash
value of any voucher should be higher if the firm proves that it provides the hired unemployed
person with training schemes.
In order to prevent wage pressure from rising, receipt of such vouchers must be restricted to
persons who have been unemployed for a longer time span. Two countervailing effects must be
taken into account in this respect. The longer the unemployed must wait before they receive
vouchers, the more difficult it is to reintegrate them into the regular labor market. This speaks in
favor of handing out vouchers in addition to regular unemployment benefits early on. However, if
short-term unemployed persons also obtain vouchers, wage pressure inevitably rises. Hence, in
determining the time span after which an unemployed person receives a voucher, there is always a
trade off between achieving a high reintegration quota into the regular labor market and avoiding
negative repercussions on wage setting. In light of these opposing effects, it might be reasonable
to deliver the first voucher after about six months of unemployment. Since chances for
reemployment shrink with the length of the unemployment spell, the size of the monthly voucher
should rise with each further month in unemployment to a maximum, say, after about two and a
half years. If an unemployed person entitled to monthly vouchers receives a job, the size of the
monthly voucher she continues to obtain is consecutively reduced. This is economically justified
because the formerly unemployed person should build up new human capital with growing time
back in employment thus being less dependent on wage subsidies. The size of the voucher must
furthermore never exceed the claim of the unemployed person to unemployment benefits in order
to not create an incentive for firms and unemployed persons to agree on fake work contracts paid
for by the government. This condition must always be satisfied even when the size of the monthly
voucher including the qualification premium reaches its maximum after say about two years of
unemployment.
Such a system of vouchers which is directly linked to the unemployment benefit system exhibits a
number of advantages. Above all, the twofold negative effect of the current unemployment
benefit system is mitigated. The current system subsidizes unemployment while it punishes
employment by financing benefits via taxes on the employed. Establishing such a voucher system33
lets the formerly unemployed persons indirectly uphold their claims to government transfers for a
while even after they are again employed. This reduces the marginal tax rate between
unemployment and regular employment significantly below hundred percent thus opening up the
current unemployment trap. Consequently, search efforts of the unemployed along with effective
labor supply will rise. Furthermore, those subsidies are directly financed out of the unemployment
insurance system which is clearly superior to a tax-financed system because wage setters are then
held to a greater extent accountable for the unemployment they helped to produce via inadequate
wage settlements. Skills are in addition conveyed on the job rather than off the job which is an
important advantage relative to government-run ALMP-schemes. Finally, such a voucher system
enables outsiders to effectively undercut insider wages thus at least temporarily enhancing
competitive pressure for them. Such targeted subsidies are therefore unlikely to lead to growing
wage pressure.
However, it might be objected that such a voucher system stigmatizes those unemployed persons
which offer firms vouchers in addition to their work input. Vouchers could signal firms that the
unemployed person is regarded by the government as having low chances of encountering
reemployment if left on her own. This negative signaling effect could just cancel out the positive
monetary incentive of hiring such an unemployed person. Yet, since it is in general not difficult at
all for firms to find out how long a job applicant has been unemployed before applying, this is not
an objection carrying significant weight. It could furthermore be objected that persons will then
prefer to stay unemployed for a longer time span in order to be entitled to receiving higher
vouchers. Yet, such a behavior is not optimal as long as the size of the initial voucher is not too
large and as long as the increase in the monthly voucher is at most sufficient to make up for the
loss in skills which has occurred in the meantime. Such an obstructive behavior on the part of the
unemployed can furthermore be contained by implementing strict rules which jobs have to be
accepted for unemployment benefits not to be canceled.
The last point shows that any reform of labor-market policies for reducing persistent structural
unemployment will be found unsatisfactory if left on its own. As long as entrepreneurs do not
have a significantly larger incentive to invest and to create new firms and jobs, obtaining sizeable
reductions of unemployment will be nothing but a chimera. In order to achieve significant34
employment gains, reforming passive and active labor-market policies must be embedded in a
large package for creating a more employment oriented institutional framework. This means
above all that wage setting must become more flexible, less aggressive and more differentiated.
The most direct way of enacting such a change in wage setting is largely abolishing government-
imposed firing costs and a bold and determined move towards decentralized wage setting. A
further key factor in achieving more employment-oriented wage setting along with a greater level
of investments and openings of new firms is a large reduction in the level of taxation that is
levied on the private sector. The government must cut back on its grip on the economy in order to
yield more freedom for entrepreneurial activities of the private sector. It is finally of utmost
importance to tear down all barriers to the establishment of new firms such as excessive goods
market regulations and badly functioning venture capital markets.
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IV. The Political Economy of Reforming Labor-Market Policy
Calls for reforming the institutional framework of labor markets in the above indicated direction
have been widespread in the economics literature in recent years. However, what appears
paradoxical is the lack of determined and comprehensive reform packages in particular in the two
most important continental European countries, namely France and Germany, which could lead to
a breakthrough on the respective labor markets. The hitherto prevalent scenario may be termed
the "Franco-German nightmare", as those two countries are the most prominent, but by no means
only European countries to have exhibited the following economic symptoms: unemployment
along with unemployment benefits and taxes are undesirably high, but the government finds it
politically infeasible to do anything decisive about it. To be sure, policy was by no means
completely inactive in recent years in a country like Germany. Rather, the reforms undertaken
were part of a piecemeal approach with only small isolated steps at a time, each of which met
with considerable political resistance and did therefore not lead to a mounting wave of reforms.
Two questions arise. First, why is it apparently so difficult to politically enforce employment
stimulating reforms of the institutional framework of labor markets? Second, is it possible to
break the stalemate on labor markets?
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1. Why Is It Politically So Difficult to Reform Labor Markets?
The first question has already received considerable attention in the literature in recent years.
38 It
is rather obvious that the actual implementation of far-reaching reforms and the deregulation of
labor markets are not particularly desirable from a political economy point of view. Labor
markets are not rigid by accident, but rather because rigid labor markets indirectly serve the
interests of politicians. Politicians are not well informed, benevolent social dictators who
maximize aggregate welfare. A realistic way of portraying political behavior should in contrast
start with the assumption that they pursue mainly their own self-interest. As their primary
objective is to win elections, they have a different way of accounting from economists: While
economists add up welfare gains and losses, politicians rather count votes. Politicians are
therefore highly reluctant to pursue policies which are economically efficient but which hurt at
least in the short run the majority of voters and/or influential special interest groups. The support
of special interest groups in the form of voting recommendations to their members and in the
form of campaign contributions is often a key factor in winning elections.
It is quite clear from this political economy perspective that policies to liberalize labor markets
and to strengthen the price mechanism on labor markets are difficult to enforce politically. Albeit
high and especially rising unemployment reduces the reelection probability of an incumbent
government, most policy recommendations to reduce structural unemployment get nonetheless
trapped in the pitfall of political infeasibility since a large part of the electorate will lose at least in
the short run and/or losses are concentrated on influential special-interest groups like unions.
Rigid labor markets let insiders gain at the expense of outsiders and at the expense of highly
qualified workers as long as those are rather immobile. They create a larger core of society which
is interested in political stability by narrowing the income differential not only between employed
workers and human capitalists, but also between employed workers and firm-owners. Protests by
outsiders are kept under control by generous welfare-state provisions and ALMPs. Politicians will
therefore be very cautious in adopting tough policy recommendations for deregulating labor
markets, especially if none of the political parties is ideologically commited to liberalizing the
labor market. This appears to be the case in most continental European countries because there
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exists a broad christian-social-democratic consensus that the labor market is to be sheltered as
much as possible from market forces.
In sum, reforming the labor market is not in the interest of governments as long as influential
interest groups like unions and the majority of voters along with the median voter prefer a rigid
labor market. The ongoing stalemate concerning labor-market reforms should therefore be
regarded as the rational choice of political decision-makers. This does not mean, though, that
rigid labor markets are there to stay forever. As the literature on the positive economics of labor-
market rigidities has shown, labor-market reform is characterized by multiple political economy
equilibria. Reforms are feasible under certain circumstances, such as in times of rapidly
increasing unemployment and immediately after elections, in particular if the electorate enacted a
switch in government. In addition, a higher real-wage elasticity of labor demand will promote
labor-market reforms since excessive wage increases become less attractive to insiders due to the
ensuing large employment losses. With a close to horizontal labor demand curve most of the
losses are carried by the insiders themselves via lay-offs. Hence, more open goods and factor
markets, as described by the catchword globalization, promote labor-market reforms in the long
run as they increase the real-wage elasticity of labor demand.
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2. Can Comprehensive Reforms Break the Political Deadlock?
However, waiting for such fortuituous circumstances is a rather unsatisfying policy
recommendation. Coming therefore to the second question, it might be asked whether anything
can be done before globalization makes even short-run labor demand sufficiently elastic so that
major reforms become finally politically feasible. An important recent idea in this respect is
related to the complementarity of reforms.
40 Policy measures such as a cut in unemployment
benefits have a much larger positive employment effect if the resulting greater intensity of job
search is met by growing labor demand, e.g. due to greater restraint in wage setting or due to a
reduction in the level of taxation. Especially the level of taxation is directly related to the
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generosity of the unemployment insurance. Generous unemployment benefits clearly require a
large level of taxation for financing them. Both policy variables can also be set by the
government. So why not enact a reform that reduces unemployment benefits and the level of
taxation simultaneously in order to embark on an upward spiral concerning employment, both via
rising labor demand and via greater effective labor supply?
This particular problem can be analyzed by means of figure 3. The tax rate is denoted by t while
the level of unemployment benefits is b. It is assumed that taxes are exclusively levied on workers
and firms for financing unemployment benefits. Hence, if b = 0, t = 0 as well. Increasing
unemployment benefits gradually from zero has a twofold effect. First, unemployment rises so
that total government layouts for unemployment benefits rise faster than the level of benefits.
Second, the tax base shrinks as employment falls, inducing a rise in the tax rate to finance a fixed
amount of government expenditure. However, rising taxes reduce the reward to work and to
invest, thus further diminishing employment. Hence, taking all effects together shows
unambiguously that, starting from the origin, a given increase in the level of unemployment
benefits leads to a more than proportionate rise in the level of taxation. This overproportionality
rises with the level of benefits and taxation because the negative effect of further increases in
taxation and unemployment benefits grow with their level. Hence, the government budget
constraint GBC becomes progressively flatter. Eventually, unemployment benefits reach a
maximum beyond which further rises in the tax rate reduce employment and thus the tax base by
so much that tax revenues shrink as a result. Thus, unemployment benefits must decline in order
to balance the government budget. This is the well-known "Laffer effect" which is depicted by the
downward sloping portion of the GBC.38
Fig. 3: Political Hysteresis Concerning Unemployment Benefits and Taxation
Source: Orszag and Snower (1998).
Analyzing the feasibility of a reform package which would simultaneously reduce the level of
benefits and of taxation in order to stimulate employment requires introducing indifference curves
of insiders and outsiders. Both sets of indifference curves are upward sloped because
unemployment benefits are a good whereas taxes are a bad to both groups. The same utility level
can therefore only be attained if higher taxes are balanced by a higher level of unemployment
benefits. However, insider indifference curves are steeper than outsider indifference curves
because insiders are more directly affected by the level of taxation whereas outsiders care more
about the level of unemployment benefits. Insiders currently pay taxes while they are only
affected by the level of unemployment benefits in case they are laid off. In contrast, outsiders
currently receive unemployment benefits whereas they only pay taxes if they find a job. Hence, a
given increase in the tax rate must be balanced by a higher increase in unemployment benefits for
insiders than for outsiders in order to keep the utility level constant and to stay on the same
indifference curve. The diagram is completed by isounemployment curves which are downward
sloped because unemployment benefits as well as the level of taxation are both positively related
to the rate of unemployment.39
The equilibrium in this scenario with just two policy variables depends on the functioning of the
political process. Assuming that only the median voter counts in political decision making and
also assuming that the median voter is an insider produces an equilibrium at point M where the
relevant insider indifference curve is just tangent to the GBC and where the utility of insiders is
maximized. However, it is quite unlikely that governments of advanced, democratic countries,
which are commited to the concept of "social market economy", will not take at all into account
the interests of outsiders which are by now a sizeable part of the population. Such behavior would
offend against the widely respected principle of liberal democracy, namely that the majority is
only allowed to enforce particular decisions if it does not involve sacrifices by a significant
minority. Thus, simply abolishing privileges of substantial minorities by majority vote without
paying any attention to their interests is in general impossible in advanced democracies. However,
interestingly and, at first glance somewhat paradoxically, taking also the interests of outsiders into
account in political decision making leads to an equilibrium which involves a higher level of
unemployment benefits and of tax rates. This is the case because outsider indifference curves are
flatter than insider indifference curves and their optimum point T therefore lies to the right of the
optimum for insiders. Intuitively, outsiders value unemployment benefits higher than insiders and
their relative aversion against high tax rates is smaller compared to insiders so that the overall
equilibrium is even less geared towards achieving a high level of employment than under pure
majority voting.
Elaborating further on this assumption that no reform against the interests of outsiders is possible
also shows that problems of political hysteresis arise. If only Pareto-improving reforms are
politically feasible, any point on the upward sloped portion of the GBC and between points M
and T is a political equilibrium. Taking e.g. point P, it is straightforward to realize that there is no
feasible combination of changes in unemployment benefits and in tax rates which is welfare
improving to insiders and to outsiders alike. The set of Pareto-improving policies is empty.
Hence, under such conditions the economy is stuck at whatever political equilibrium it happens to
find itself initially. Calls by economists for lower unemployment benefits and lower tax rates for40
stimulating employment, which are inspired by normative considerations, are in such situations
useless from a political-economy point of view.
41
Large-scale reforms become possible, however, if the economy happens to be on the downward-
sloped portion of the GBC as in figure 4. Such a situation can occur e.g. after large adverse
shocks or after a tax and spend government has been in office for some while. A particularly
interesting example is globalization itself, which reduces the tax revenues earned at any given tax
rate by giving mobile capital and workers greater exit possibilities. Hence, the GBC moves
downwards and to the left. If the tax rate was already relatively large initially and if the tax rate is
not immediately adjusted after the shock, globalization might displace the economy from point P
to a point like P', which is to the right of the maximum of GBC'. Yet, there is now a large set of
possible Pareto-improving reforms. Unemployment benefits as well as taxes can in principle now
be lowered all the way down to the point where the relevant outsider indifference curve intersects
with the upward sloped section of the GBC' in point Q. Hence, this is an example where
globalization is a blessing because it can enlargen the politically feasible set of reforms by
initially worsening the situation. Both policy variables need to be changed simultaneously,
though, with the explicit purpose of exploiting the arising economic and political
complementarities. Piecemeal, uncoordinated reform, in which one policy variable is adjusted at a
time, runs the risk of getting stuck early on in the reform process because after the first policy
instrument has been adjusted, the economy may arrive at a political equilibrium involving
political hysteresis, preventing the second policy instrument from being changed as well.
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Fig. 4: Large-Scale Reforms under "Laffer" Conditions
But what if a country does not find itself under Laffer conditions? Is such a country then doomed
to stay in the status quo position such as point P in figure 3 which is not only inefficient due to
high unemployment, but also inequitable, because insiders are much better off than outsiders?
The political deadlock can be broken by broad-based reforms, i.e. by enlarging the set of available
policy variables. Including further complementary policy measures in a package approach enables
the government to compensate the losers of reforms without sacrificing efficiency gains. In the
specific case considered, political hysteresis arises out of a simple conflict of interests: the
government is unable to achieve simultaneous reductions in tax rates and in unemployment
benefits, which are desirable from a normative point of view, because this would hurt the
unemployed.
However, the stalemate can be overcome by including other instruments in the package, e.g. the
afore-described hiring vouchers and/or a reduction of firing costs. Introducing a voucher system
by itself clearly raises the welfare of outsiders because their reemployment chances rise. This
occurs at the expense of insiders because competitive pressure for insiders would rise, in
particular, because firms would have an incentive to replace some of their insiders by subsidized
new recruits. Yet, insiders could be compensated for this loss by an adequate reduction in tax42
rates, for which they are particularly susceptible, financed by a reduction in unemployment
benefits. The same effect can in principle be achieved by reducing government-imposed firing
costs which increase the hiring chances of outsiders but increase the probability of current
insiders that they will be laid off sometimes in the future. The political feasibility could be be
further promoted by also including measures to alleviate imperfections in capital and goods
markets, which especially hinder the creation of new fims and employment growth. Hence, a
circumspect and balanced combination of all five policy instruments in a package - reduction of
tax rates, of unemployment benefits and of government-imposed firing costs along with a
simultaneous introduction of hiring vouchers and with efficiency-enhancing reforms of capital
and goods markets - can lead to a Pareto improvement and should thus be politically feasible. The
failure of governments to implement such broad-based packages of complementary reform
measures may be a key reason for why unemployment is so persistent in continental Europe and
for why the "Franco-German nightmare" endures. Interestingly in this respect, the only two
European countries which have significantly improved their employment performance in recent
years, namely the UK and the Netherlands, have precisely relied on such a package approach by
implementing a large set of complementary reform measures close to simultaneously.
V. Concluding Remarks
Mass unemployment is the major challenge to capitalist societies in the post-communist era. The
ongoing process of globalization is in particular often blamed for the dismal situation on
continental European labor markets. However, as has been shown, whether globalization leads to
rising unemployment depends crucially on the institutional setup of the economy under
investigation. Globalization first and foremost raises global welfare. It does furthermore not
increase unemployment in countries where markets are well functioning and where governments
by and large restrict themselves to efficiency-enhancing activities. However, the more
governments interfere with the functioning of markets, in particular of labor markets, often
motivated by distributional objectives, the more globalization exposes the drawbacks of such
efficiency-reducing activities. Globalization raises rather dramatically the costs of regulations
which distort the allocation of resources. Hence, deregulating especially labor markets and43
gearing labor-market policy more towards effectively fighting unemployment must remain high
up on the agenda for economic policy.
Yet, any policy analysis which does not take into account the politico-economic objectives for
installing rigid labor markets remains incomplete. Overcoming the politico-economic hurdles is
the major obstacle against implementing labor-market reforms. In particular, any government
which adopts a piecemeal approach in reforming labor markets and labor market policy is likely
to get stuck early on in the reform process without having achieved much. The analysis revealed
that only large scale reforms which include a multitude of complementary reform measures can
be expected to produce major employment gains and at the same time be politically viable.
Hence, concerning labor markets, installing a much more restrictive unemployment benefit
system, reducing government-imposed firing restrictions, decentralizing wage bargaining down to
the firm or individual level, introducing a comprehensive system of hiring vouchers and reducing
tax wedges should be combined in an encompassing supply-side package for more growth and
employment. The current reemergence of Keynesian thinking does in any case not address the
major causes of European unemployment and is therefore highly likely to fail in the fight for
lasting reductions of persistently high unemployment. The neglect of supply-side considerations
associated with this renewed emphasis on Keynesian-type problems is likely to lead to another
appropriation shock similar to those in the late sixties and early seventies with fatal long-run
consequences for the employment situation.44
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